Legislature(2009 - 2010)CAPITOL 120
02/10/2010 01:00 PM House JUDICIARY
| Audio | Topic |
|---|---|
| Start | |
| HB319 | |
| HB316 | |
| Adjourn |
* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
| *+ | HB 319 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| += | HB 316 | TELECONFERENCED | |
| + | TELECONFERENCED |
HB 316 - POST-CONVICTION DNA TESTING; EVIDENCE
2:01:11 PM
CHAIR RAMRAS announced that the final order of business would be
HOUSE BILL NO. 316, "An Act relating to post-conviction DNA
testing, to the preservation of certain evidence, and to the DNA
identification registration system; relating to post-conviction
relief procedures; relating to representation by the public
defender; amending Rule 35.1, Alaska Rules of Criminal
Procedure; and providing for an effective date."
2:03:58 PM
ANNE CARPENETI, Assistant Attorney General, Legal Services
Section, Criminal Division, Department of Law (DOL), proffered
that HB 316 attempts to find a balance, and that it addresses
two important issues of law: one, evidence retention, and, two,
post-conviction deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing. Both of
these issues have countervailing considerations. The evidence
retention provisions of the bill would adopt new requirements
for law enforcement in Alaska, and the DOL is proceeding
cautiously in this regard because law enforcement agencies
across the state, in both large and small communities, would be
asked to retain evidence for significant periods of time. The
bill, therefore, addresses only the most serious of crimes and
the crimes most likely to have evidence that could be needed at
a later date for purposes of cold case prosecution or post-
conviction DNA testing. Currently, the bill's evidence
retention provisions would apply to homicides, sexual assault in
the first degree crimes, and sexual abuse of a minor in the
first degree crimes.
MS. CARPENETI relayed that the bill divides evidence into two
groups: physical evidence, such as cars, watches, money, and
other similar items; and biological material, which is defined
in proposed AS 12.36.200(k)(2) as:
(A) the contents of a sexual assault forensic
examination kit;
(B) semen, blood, hair, saliva, skin tissue,
fingernail scrapings, bone, bodily fluids, or other
identifiable human bodily material, collected as part
of a criminal investigation;
(C) a slide, swab, or test tube containing material
described in (B) of this paragraph; and
(D) swabs or cuttings from items that contain material
described in (B) of this paragraph;
MS. CARPENETI, with regard to proposed subparagraph (D),
explained that this provision addresses, for example, a cutting
from the seat of a car where a rape occurred; in such an
instance, it would be the cutting that would be retained and not
the car itself. The periods of retention and the treatment of
evidence would be different for the two types of evidence.
Physical evidence pertaining to crimes against the person would
be kept until such time as the appeal process has run its
course. Biological material would be kept until the defendant
has been unconditionally released - after probation and/or
parole has been served.
2:07:36 PM
MS. CARPENETI said that HB 316 generally tracks federal law, and
is somewhat more limited than other, similar legislation
currently moving through the process. One aspect of the bill is
that it specifically provides that each law enforcement agency
shall adopt written policy pertaining to evidence collection and
retention, though the various law enforcement agencies will have
different procedures depending on their size and capabilities.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said he strongly supports the retention
of evidence, but is concerned about the fiscal implications for
law enforcement agencies.
MS. CARPENETI relayed that over the years, the DOL has had
discussions [with municipal law enforcement agencies] regarding
other iterations of this bill, and when a similar measure was
heard in the Senate last year, such agencies expressed no
opposition. In response to a question, she offered her belief
that Village Public Safety Officers (VPSOs) are certainly
capable of preserving evidence in a safe way so that it isn't
tampered with, and she sees no reason why VPSOs couldn't take
good care of evidence. She noted that the task force the bill
proposes to create would address the specifics of preserving
evidence in a safe manner so that it could be of use in 20
years, for example.
MS. CARPENETI explained that HB 316 also provides procedures
allowing for a law enforcement agency to return evidence. For
example, if a car hits another car that in turn hits a third car
and a death results, the car in the middle of the accident
needn't be kept for purposes of prosecution, and people want to
get their property back whenever possible. Currently, however,
such would be difficult because prosecutors would be concerned
about authorizing the return of property, but under the proposed
procedures, if everyone is notified and nobody objects, the
property can be returned. Furthermore, the bill adopts a
procedure for notifying those convicted as a result of the
evidence, their attorneys, and the prosecuting authority, and
provides a judicial procedure for those objecting to the return
of property.
MS. CARPENETI said that the bill also provides that if a law
enforcement agency does not follow the procedure adopted, the
court may order the remedy it determines to be appropriate;
however, the bill does provide that the court can't reverse a
conviction based solely on a violation of evidence retention
standards.
2:14:32 PM
MS. CARPENETI said that although Alaska's existing post-
conviction relief procedures were upheld by the U.S. Supreme
Court, it's probably a good idea to set out statutes dealing
with post-conviction DNA testing. House Bill 316 sets
standards, and balances the right of a person, in the unlikely
event that he/she has been wrongfully convicted, to bring an
application for post-conviction DNA testing, against the rights
of victims and others to depend on perfectly good convictions
that were fairly found. The bill requires an applicant to file
an affidavit stating that he/she is not guilty, did not commit
the offense he/she was convicted of or any lesser-included
offense, was not an accomplice, and no had other relationship to
the crime.
MS. CARPENETI went on to explain that the bill provides that
someone who has been convicted, that has had an opportunity for
an appeal, and that has had an opportunity for post-conviction
applications on other bases, should not get another opportunity
to fine tune the legal basis for his/her conviction. The bill,
instead, is intended to allow a person who is actually innocent
of the charges to have another opportunity to raise that point
in front of the court. She surmised that some people would
prefer that the bill open up convictions in order to fine tune
what charge the person was convicted of or in order to fine tune
a sentence in particular, but HB 316 doesn't do that. Again,
instead, the bill sets up a procedure for people who did not
commit the crime to then bring an application and have the issue
heard in front of the court.
[Chair Ramras turned the gavel over to Vice Chair Dahlstrom.]
MS. CARPENETI said that an applicant, under those circumstances,
must file an affidavit saying, under penalty of perjury, that
he/she did not commit the crime, thereby exposing
himself/herself to further prosecution if it is found that post-
conviction DNA testing confirms that that person committed that
crime and is guilty of the offense. So there is a risk, she
added.
2:17:09 PM
REPRESENTATIVE HERRON asked about those who plead guilty but are
actually innocent.
MS. CARPENETI noted that the language of proposed
AS 12.73.020(9) says that one of the things that the court must
find [before it orders post-conviction DNA testing] is that if
the applicant was convicted after a trial, that the identity of
the perpetrator was a disputed issue at trial. She offered her
belief that this language recognizes that innocent people do
plead guilty for reasons other than that they are guilty. A
person could not, however, testify in court that he/she killed
someone in self-defense and then later bring an application for
post-conviction relief claiming to actually be innocent of the
crime altogether.
REPRESENTATIVE HERRON expressed an interest in amending the bill
[to address this issue further].
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN offered his understanding that the term,
"lesser-included offense" means that if someone were convicted
of homicide, then the lesser-included offenses would be
manslaughter and other, lesser degrees of killing, not, for
example, the crimes of burglary or speeding or any other thing
that he/she could also be charged with under the particular
facts of the case.
MS. CARPENETI concurred, and again noted that the post-
conviction relief application provisions of the bill only apply
to felony crimes against a person: homicides, sexual assault in
the first degree crimes, and sexual abuse of a minor in the
first degree crimes.
2:21:36 PM
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG, referring to proposed AS 12.73.020(9),
said he could envision a situation in which a defendant might
not have disputed the issue of identity due to ineffective
counsel, and expressed an interest in amending the bill to
address that point.
MS. CARPENETI, mentioning that post-conviction relief is a very
complicated area of law, pointed out that ineffectiveness of
counsel is another basis for bringing an application for post-
conviction relief. In response to a question, she offered her
belief that if ineffectiveness of counsel were the basis for an
application, then DNA testing could be ordered if the court
found it appropriate.
MS. CARPENETI noted that the provisions pertaining to post-
conviction DNA testing are based largely on federal law, and
[under proposed AS 12.73.020,] also require, among other things,
that the evidence to be tested was subject to a chain of custody
such that it was preserved in a way that it could be tested and
the results relied upon; and that the defendant requesting the
testing identify a theory of defense that is not inconsistent
with the theory of defense posed at trial. This latter
requirement is intended to ensure that a defendant doesn't claim
during the trial that the person he/she killed was killed in
self defense, for example, but then, for testing purposes, claim
that he/she wasn't at the scene at all and is therefore totally
innocent. The DOL is trying to, in a fair way, draw lines with
regard to who could qualify for post-conviction DNA testing
under the bill.
[Vice Chair Dahlstrom returned the gavel to Chair Ramras.]
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG said he could see a situation in which
a defendant didn't raise a particular theory at trial because
there wasn't yet any scientific evidence to support it.
2:26:12 PM
MS. CARPENETI went on to explain that in applying for post-
conviction DNA testing under the bill, the defendant must submit
an affidavit - a sworn statement - that he/she did not commit
the offense for which he/she was convicted, or any lesser
included offense, did not solicit another person to commit the
offense, did not aid or abet in the planning or commission of
the offense, and did not admit or concede guilt for the offense
in any official proceeding. On that latter requirement, she
said that the DOL believes that people should be responsible for
the statements they make during such proceedings, and that
people should be required to declare that they are innocent in
order to obtain post-conviction DNA testing. The application
must also contain a description of the prior testing conducted
on a particular piece of evidence.
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN questioned why a person in jail for life for
killing someone would be concerned about being found guilty of
perjury.
MS. CARPENETI acknowledged that for some people, the risk of
being found guilty of perjury would not necessarily have any
measurable deterrent effect. She mentioned that lawyers,
however, as officers of the court, are responsible [for ensuring
that their clients don't commit perjury]. In response to a
question, she recounted that in [the U.S. Supreme Court case,
[District Attorney's Office for the Third Judicial District v.
Osborne], Mr. Osborne refused to say that he was innocent and
instead only stated that he would be either guilty or innocent
based upon the results of DNA testing. She again opined that
this proposed procedure should be limited to only those who are
willing to say they are innocent, particularly given that at the
point in time that they would apply for post-conviction DNA
testing, they would have already had a trial, gone through the
appeal process, had an opportunity to petition a higher court,
and had other post-conviction relief remedies available to them.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG noted that a person could enter what he
called a "guilty but not mentally responsible" plea. He asked
whether entering such a plea would preclude the defendant from
applying for post-conviction DNA testing under the bill.
MS. CARPENETI indicated that such a plea would preclude the
defendant from applying, but asked to be allowed to research the
issue further to confirm that point.
2:30:53 PM
MS. CARPENETI then reiterated that under the bill, in order for
a judge to order post-conviction DNA testing, the crime the
person is convicted of has to be a felony crime against a person
under AS 11.41; the aforementioned required affidavit must be
submitted; and the person must not have admitted or conceded
guilt in an official proceeding. Furthermore, the evidence must
have been obtained as part of the investigation of the crime,
and the evidence must either not have been tested and the right
to testing not waived, or was tested but the applicant wants
more sophisticated DNA testing to be conducted. Again, the
evidence must have been subject to a chain of custody such that
it has been preserved in a way that any testing results would be
accurate; the defendant requesting the testing must identify a
theory of defense not inconsistent with the theory of defense
posed at trial, [and claim that] the testing would establish
his/her innocence; and if the applicant was convicted after a
trial, the identity of the perpetrator has to have been a
disputed issue at trial. Under the bill, there is also a
requirement that there be a reasonable probability that the
requested testing will produce new evidence that would support
the new defense theory and could establish the defendant's
innocence.
MS. CARPENETI mentioned that HB 316 also contains a provision
addressing timeliness; under that provision, there is a
presumption that an application brought before three years after
the date of conviction is timely, and a presumption that an
application brought three or more years after conviction is not
timely but is not necessarily precluded as long as any good
cause can be shown for the delay in applying. The bill sets out
fairly complicated testing procedures for when post-conviction
DNA testing is ordered; does not prohibit the prosecutor and the
defendant from agreeing to conduct post-conviction DNA testing
without the defendant filing an application; and makes
corrective changes to [AS 44.41.035], which pertains to the
Department of Public Safety's (DPS's) DNA database.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLMES noted that although proposed AS
12.73.040(1) says that a timely application for post-conviction
DNA testing is one that is filed before three years after the
date of conviction, proposed AS 12.36.200(a)(1)(A) says that
agencies shall preserve evidence for 18 months after the entry
of a judgment of conviction.
MS. CARPENETI indicated that agencies shall preserve evidence
for at least the later of the various periods of times listed in
the bill, and that those periods of time listed are minimums,
not maximums. She reiterated that under the bill, biological
evidence shall be retained until the defendant has been
unconditionally released from probation and/or parole. Again,
the timeliness provision was taken from federal law, and
establishes a presumption, rather than a statute of limitations,
and provides that the presumption may be rebutted for any good
cause if the filing occurred three or more years after
conviction. She characterized the [timeliness] provision as
pretty liberal.
2:35:45 PM
REBECCA BROWN, Policy Advocate, Innocence Project, relayed that
nationally, 250 individuals have been exonerated by DNA testing,
with the latest exoneration taking place just last week. Nearly
all of the exonerations were made possible by the presence of a
state-level post-conviction DNA testing law. Many, if not most
of the exonerated had to languish in prison, waiting until their
state passed a post-conviction DNA testing law, thus enabling
them to prove they were innocent. Many innocent men and women
across the country are still incarcerated, subject to the daily
torture of prison life. This seems incomprehensible, she
remarked, given that 47 states have passed DNA testing laws, but
[her organization] has come to learn that many of the innocent
are barred from seeking testing because the laws in their states
are structured in a way that denies the very testing that was
initially sought via the passage of those laws. The current
situation demonstrates the fallibility of human judgment; over
and over, people, some who even seemed guilty when the Innocence
Project reviewed their petitions [for assistance], turned out to
be innocent, and vice versa, and this is due to the fact that in
any system created by humans, errors are made.
MS. BROWN stated that the Innocence Project's agenda is a pro-
law enforcement agenda that seeks reforms which protect the
innocent and identify the guilty. In more than 40 percent of
the Innocence Project's cases, forensic testing that excluded
its clients led to the eventual detection of the true
perpetrators of the heinous crimes the innocent people were
convicted for. A robust DNA testing law that ensures access to
all deserving applicants, therefore, will help Alaska not only
exculpate and free the innocent but also identify criminals.
She then indicated that the Innocence Project is troubled by
some of the provisions of HB 316. For example, the bill would
require individuals seeking testing under the existing but
insufficient post-conviction relief process to forego that
process in favor of a DNA testing framework that denies nearly
every, if not all, deserving applicants.
MS. BROWN relayed that the Innocence Project thinks that the
most restrictive provision of the bill is that which pertains to
timeliness; it would effectively establish a three-year statute
of limitations from the time of conviction on filing a post-
conviction claim of innocence, and yet nearly every single
individual who was able to prove innocence through DNA testing
had already exhausted every available state remedy as well as
federal habeas corpus relief before he/she sought testing, as
had nearly all of the Innocence Project's clients. Under the
bill as currently written, none of these individuals would have
been eligible for post-conviction DNA testing, and neither would
nearly every exonerated person in the country. There are many
reasons why a person would not file a DNA test application
within three years of conviction, including, for example, poor
legal advice, illiteracy, a belief that the evidence was not
collected or that it was not preserved, a mistrust of the
criminal justice system, or a lack of knowledge about the
ability to perform testing. Again, as currently written, the
timeliness requirement would have barred almost all of the
individuals around the country who've proven their innocence,
and there is not one law in the nation that includes such a
restrictive timeliness provision. Indeed, 35 of the 47 existing
statutes have no time limitation whatsoever.
2:40:01 PM
MICHAEL J. WALLERI, General Counsel, Tanana Chiefs Conference
(TCC), said that currently, the TCC is opposed to [HB 316] in
its existing form based on a number of issues. One issue is
that under the TCC's interpretation of the Osborne case, there
is no constitutional right to prove innocence and it's up to the
states to develop their own standards. The science pertaining
to DNA is very accurate, and DNA testing can establish identity
beyond a reasonable doubt. Mr. Walleri went on to say:
We see the tension here a little differently between
two interests: one is ... the interest that the
innocent should not be punished, as opposed to the
administrative expense and inconvenience of retaining
evidence - biological evidence - and having to deal
with redundant or frivolous testing requests. ... I
think the committee is quite well aware that ... the
Native people of Alaska are highly disproportionately
represented in the incarcerated population. ... The
balance for the Native community really tips heavily
in favor of protecting the ... [innocent] because of
the concern over ... the proportionality and what many
[people] believe to be a ... disparate treatment of
Native American people in the Alaska criminal justice
system - which has been documented over and over.
[In] ... that regard, it's our position that a person
should have a right to prove [his/her] innocence,
somewhat at odds with the recent decision of the
[U.S.] Supreme Court, ... and consistent with that
view is that the procedural barriers in state statute
should not limit the right of people to prove their
innocence. We believe that this bill, in several
instances, actually does that; it creates procedural
barriers that would prevent truly innocent people from
coming forward to ... [show] that.
MR. WALLERI relayed that another of the TCC's concern pertains
to the destruction of evidence, with particularly serious
concern over the language of proposed AS 12.36.200(e). The
TCC's view is that this provision is backwards, that if an
agency is going to destroy biological evidence, that instead
there should really be a court procedure involved so that the
court can ensure protections for the innocent. Another of the
TCC's major concerns pertains to the provision related to the
findings [outlined in proposed AS 12.73.020] required for post-
conviction DNA testing orders. A number of those findings, he
opined, are really barriers to obtaining post-conviction relief,
and the TCC disagrees with the DOL's characterization of [these
findings].
MR. WALLERI mentioned that within the Native community, the TCC
is constantly hearing concerns regarding ineffectiveness of
counsel, and although most times people's lawyers do a good job,
there are cases wherein things just slip through the cracks.
There is also the whole issue of whether a person's attorney
decides to take a "Cooksey appeal" [Cooksey v. State, 524 P.2d
1251, 1255-57 (Alaska 1974)]; under the bill, anyone who does so
would be precluded from seeking post-conviction relief based
upon innocence. In addition, there are issues regarding the
standard that [there be a reasonable probability that post-
conviction DNA testing] will show conclusively that the
applicant is innocent, compared to just establishing that
reasonable doubt exists.
MR. WALLERI indicated that the TCC has concerns regarding
[proposed AS 12.73.020 as it pertains to] the issue of
effectiveness of counsel, and about [proposed AS 12.73.020(6)]
in that it requires that the evidence must have been subject to
a chain of custody such that it could be relied upon. On the
latter point, he opined that if an error in the chain of custody
occurred - even though the evidence would have been fully within
the government's control - the burden of that error would be
placed on the applicant and could be used as the basis for
denying post-conviction relief. He said that the TCC would
agree with the earlier comments regarding timeliness, in that if
an incarcerated person is innocent and can prove it, [an
application filed three years or more from conviction] should
not be deemed untimely as a matter of legal presumption.
MR. WALLERI urged the committee to give the provisions
establishing a task force to address the specifics of preserving
evidence more consideration because currently the proposed
membership doesn't include a member of the defense bar. "This
is a highly biased task force designed to advance the ...
interest of prosecution, and that is greatly disturbing to us,
and we'd like to see a little bit more balanced ...
representation within that task force," he added in conclusion.
CHAIR RAMRAS ventured that the bill is just a beginning and
warrants amending so that it doesn't overwhelm existing State
resources.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG asked Mr. Walleri and Ms. Brown to
provide their testimony and any suggested changes to the
committee in writing.
2:48:41 PM
WILLIAM B. OBERLY, Executive Director, Alaska Innocence Project,
said that legislation pertaining to evidence preservation and
post-conviction DNA testing is very important to the Alaska
Innocence Project. Evidence preservation and post-conviction
DNA testing allow his organization to carry out its mission.
However, a bill that restricts post-conviction DNA testing or
gives only illusory access condemns the innocent to no relief
and makes justice in Alaska illusory. Although there is a need
for post-conviction DNA testing in Alaska, as currently written,
HB 316 does not provide reasonable access to post-conviction DNA
testing. If passed, it would instead be the most restrictive
DNA testing law in the country, and more restrictive than
Alaska's current process. In other words, as currently written,
an individual attempting to prove his/her innocence would be
better of without HB 316 becoming law.
MR. OBERLY offered his belief that proposed AS 12.73.040
institutes a three-year time limitation, and said he disagrees
with the DOL's assertion that an application could be accepted
for any good cause, because the language of proposed AS
12.73.040(2)(B) instead uses the term, "other good cause". That
is a significant linguistic difference, he opined, because if
the court were to interpret proposed AS 12.73.040(2), it would
first look to proposed AS 12.73.040(2)(A) - which indicates that
an [untimely] application could be accepted if the applicant was
incompetent and that incompetence substantially contributed to
the delay. Applicant incompetence and its resulting substantial
contribution to a delay is a serious situation, and, therefore,
any other good cause would have to be just as serious, he
predicted. If the State means for any good cause to be
sufficient for rebuttal of the presumption of untimeliness, then
that language needs amending, because otherwise it would bar a
number of people from bringing an [application].
MR. OBERLY ventured it is likely that there are currently
innocent men and women in prison in Alaska, with their cases
"undiscovered and undeveloped." "This" is a long process, he
remarked; for example, the first case the Alaska Innocence
Project filed for testing - which is currently still working its
way through the courts - was filed nine years after the
[defendant's] last court hearing. He said he just doesn't
understand a deadline on innocence being put into the bill,
particularly given that 35 of the 47 states that have passed
similar legislation don't have a time limitation. If an
innocence claim meets the standard and evidence can be located
to be tested, what does Alaska gain by putting arbitrary time
limits on such actions?
MR. OBERLY referred to proposed AS 12.73.020(5), and said he
finds the restriction on post-conviction DNA testing for
evidence that wasn't tested at the trial level to be
particularly troubling, because it makes a person pay the price
for a bad decision on the part of his/her lawyer or due to a
lack of funds for testing, and because it also allows the
prosecution, the holder of the evidence, to choose not to test
the evidence at the time of the trial and then later deny a
request for post-conviction DNA testing. If a criminal trial is
truly a search for the truth and evidence that might contain DNA
exists, then failure to test is as much the fault of the
prosecution as of the defense, perhaps more so since, again, the
prosecution holds the evidence.
2:53:55 PM
MR. OBERLY also indicated concern regarding the provisions of
the bill that preclude post-conviction DNA testing for anyone
who has admitted or conceded guilt in an official proceeding,
and suggested that those provisions should be clarified,
particularly given that those who [falsely] admit guilt in
official proceedings are overrepresented by the vulnerable: the
young, the disabled - the very individuals the government should
protect. Of particular concern to the Alaska Innocence Project
is the real and significant impact the aforementioned
restrictions are going to have on Native Alaskans' just claims
of innocence. There are likely to be a number of Native
Alaskans who are innocent of the charges for which they were
convicted who have not yet been identified, and given the
relationship of Native Alaskans to the criminal justice system,
a high percentage of such cases will involve pleas or admissions
of guilt, and due to financial restrictions and remote
representation in the Bush, such criminal defendants are likely
to not have had DNA testing. He said he doesn't believe that
the provisions of HB 316 are race neutral, and, as a result,
will therefore have a much greater negative impact on Native
Alaskans.
MR. OBERLY observed that HB 316 also contains indirect
restrictions such as the one requiring the applicant to pay for
the retrieval of evidence, found in proposed AS 12.36.200(d) and
proposed AS 12.73.050(c), and likened this requirement to that
of requiring a rape victim to pay for her own rape exam. He
surmised that this requirement would bar many potential
applicants. There is also a requirement [via proposed AS
12.73.020(10)] that a court guess at the outcome of post-
conviction DNA testing before it orders that testing; no other
[post-conviction DNA testing] law in the nation has such a
requirement, which he characterized as perplexing.
MR. OBERLY referred to the provisions establishing the
aforementioned task force, and opined that they should also
include guidelines regarding the retention of evidence, and
stipulate that the membership shall include a member of the
defense bar and a member of what he called the "innocence
community." He offered his belief that the DOL's approach via
HB 316 is to restrict the number of cases wherein a defendant
can seek post-conviction DNA testing. This is in contrast with
the Alaska Innocence Project's approach of seeking those
Alaskans who've been wrongfully convicted and then, hopefully,
identifying the real perpetrators of the crimes. This, however,
requires a statute without significant restrictions such as
those included in HB 316, he opined. In conclusion, he offered
his belief that HB 316 can still be salvaged as long as it is
amended to truly allow innocent individuals access to post-
conviction DNA testing that may prove their case.
REPRESENTATIVE LYNN, in response to a comment, argued that his
goal is to get the guilty in jail, noting that if there is an
innocent person in jail, then that means that there is still a
guilty person running around free. "We want to do whatever we
can to get the guilty folks in jail, and, as a corollary, get
the innocent folks out of jail - that's the direction [that] we
ought to be going; to me, it's ... a public safety issue as well
as an issue of justice for the person who's wrongfully in jail,"
he concluded.
3:00:42 PM
JEFFREY A. MITTMAN, Executive Director, American Civil Liberties
Union of Alaska (ACLU of Alaska), said that the ACLU of Alaska
would be providing written testimony, and concurs with the
remarks of Mr. Oberly and Mr. Walleri and their analyses [of
HB 316].
[HB 316 was held over.]
| Document Name | Date/Time | Subjects |
|---|---|---|
| 01 HB316 HJUD Hearing Request.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 316 |
| 02 HB316 Sectional v. A.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 316 |
| 03 HB316 Bill v. A.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 316 |
| 04 HB316-LAW-CRIM-01-28-10.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 316 |
| 05 HB316-DOA-OPA-02-01-10.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 316 |
| 06 HB316-DOA-PDA-02-01-10.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 316 |
| 07 HB316 Innocence Project Analysis.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 316 |
| 08 Alaska Innocents Project COMMITTEELETTER (2).pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
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| 09 RBROWN INNOCENCE PROJECT TESTIMONY.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
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| 10 DNA Word Matrix revised6.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
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| 01 HB319 Sponsor Statement.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 319 |
| 02 HB319 Bill v A.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 319 |
| 03 HB319 Sectional.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 319 |
| 04 HB319-LAW-CRIM-02-04-10.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 319 |
| 05 HB319 Background.pdf |
HJUD 2/10/2010 1:00:00 PM |
HB 319 |